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 Enforcing the Charter: The 
Supervisory Role of Superior Courts 
and the Responsibility of 
Legislatures for Remedial Systems 
Marilyn L. Pilkington* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Let us consider what a Canadian superior court will do if faced with 
a recalcitrant government which declines to respect constitutional rights 
in its delivery of programs and services. We know that, in appropriate 
circumstances, the Supreme Court of Canada is prepared to read words 
into legislation to correct an infringement of constitutional rights, 
thereby displacing legislative powers. Will it authorize superior court 
judges to take on a supervisory role where a government administers its 
programs in a manner that infringes constitutional rights? Federal court 
judges in the United States have taken on such a role. Should Canadian 
judges be more cautious in doing so? Is there something about executive 
or administrative powers that entitles them to more deference than is 
due to legislation? Is there something about the relationship of legisla-
tures and courts in Canada that differs from that in the United States?  
In its recent decision in Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister 
of Education),1 the Supreme Court of Canada provided its initial per-
spective on issues that will occupy courts in the exercise of supervisory 
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1  [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, [2003] S.C.J. No. 63, on appeal from the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal (2001), 194 N.S.R. (2d) 323, [2001] N.S.J. No. 240 (C.A.), (Flinn J.A. for the major-
ity, Freeman J.A. dissenting); on appeal from the order of LeBlanc J. of the Supreme Court of 
Nova Scotia (2000), 185 N.S.R. (2d) 246 (S.C.) [hereinafter “Doucet-Boudreau”]. 
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remedies for constitutional infringement. The majority judges2 asserted 
that the appropriateness of supervisory remedies does not arise in this 
case, and assessed the remedy at issue in pragmatic terms, reflecting a 
willingness to tailor remedial powers as needed to provide effective 
enforcement of rights. The dissenting judges,3 however, were intent on 
erecting guardrails, and maybe roadblocks, on what they perceived to be 
the slippery slope of inappropriate judicial intervention in government 
administration. Even the dissenters concluded that supervisory remedies 
will be appropriate where other remedies have failed, and thus the Court 
unanimously affirmed the availability of supervisory remedies. What 
separated the majority judges and those in dissent appears to be a matter 
of degree — should supervisory remedies be available only as a matter 
of last resort, or should they constitute one of the choices among several 
options for remedying constitutional infringements? I will review their 
reasons and the factors they would consider in determining when super-
visory remedies are appropriate. 
Whether or not there is a hierarchy of remedies, it is evident that 
courts and tribunals with power to decide Charter issues will not be able 
to fulfill the purpose of section 24(1)4 of the Charter unless they have 
the capacity to tailor the remedy to the right and to the infringement. In 
Doucet-Boudreau the majority judges held that superior court judges 
have broad jurisdiction and discretion to select from the full range of 
appropriate and just remedies for Charter infringements, and that this 
jurisdiction cannot be limited by statute or common law. Accordingly, 
there will always be at least one court to which a claimant can resort to 
seek a remedy for a constitutional wrong. Nonetheless, the majority 
judges join with the dissenting judges in citing with approval earlier 
decisions of the Court that limit the broad language of section 24(1) by 
confining the constitutional jurisdiction of statutory and inferior courts 
                                                                                                                                
2 The majority reasons are written jointly by Iacobucci and Arbour JJ., concurred in 
by McLachlin C.J., Gonthier and Bastarache JJ.  
3 The dissenting reasons are written jointly by LeBel and Deschamps JJ., concurred in 
by Major and Binnie JJ. 
4 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 24(1): 
Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed 
or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the 
court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances. 
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and tribunals within their ordinary jurisdiction. I will argue that consti-
tutional provisions should not be subordinated to the jurisdictional and 
procedural systems that were in place before the Charter was adopted; 
that courts are not able to revise these systems on a case-by-case basis; 
and that Parliament and legislatures have a constitutional responsibility 
to review and amend statutory jurisdiction and procedure to give effect 
to the broad remedial jurisdiction conferred in section 24(1). Since the 
enforcement of constitutional rights and freedoms depends on private 
prosecution, it is important that claimants who establish an unjustified 
infringement be entitled to an appropriate and just remedy. The entitle-
ment should not be deflected by unnecessary jurisdictional and proce-
dural hurdles, multiplicity of proceedings, potentially conflicting results, 
and attendant costs.  
The majority decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Doucet-
Boudreau v. Nova Scotia indicates that the Court will continue to be 
cautious in developing appropriate and just remedies for constitutional 
wrongs under section 24(1) of the Charter, but that the majority is pre-
pared to be flexible and pragmatic, to assess the appropriateness of a 
remedy in the context of the right and the nature of the infringement, 
and to respect the trial judge’s exercise of discretionary judgment. It is 
difficult to predict whether the majority position will hold. Both of the 
co-authors of the majority position will soon retire from the Court, and 
new appointments could shift the balance toward the dissenting judges’ 
narrower view of the court’s role. The dissenting reasons, supported by 
four members of the Court, are argued in strong, even adversarial, 
terms, espousing a commitment to a constitutional doctrine of separation 
of powers that supports judicial restraint in the supervision of executive 
action.  
In this paper, I will consider the reasons of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Doucet- Boudreau v. Nova Scotia, the circumstances in which 
judicial supervision of government programs will constitute the appro-
priate and just remedy for constitutional infringement, and the responsi-
bility of Parliament and the legislatures to review established 
jurisdictional and procedural systems to ensure that they provide effec-
tive frameworks for developing and enforcing remedies pursuant to 
section 24(1) of the Charter. 
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II.  THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA IN 
DOUCET-BOUDREAU V. NOVA SCOTIA 
1. The Issues in Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia 
Sixteen years after minority language education rights were guaran-
teed in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, francophone parents ap-
plied to the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia for an order directing the 
province of Nova Scotia and the Conseil Scolaire Acadien to fund and 
provide facilities and programs in the French language at the secondary 
level. The provincial government did not dispute the parents’ rights or 
their entitlement to facilities and programs, but delayed in complying 
with its obligations despite clear indications that assimilation was un-
dercutting the constitutional entitlement. The trial judge ordered the 
province and the Conseil to provide the facilities and programs, and to 
use their best efforts to meet specified deadlines. In addition, he retained 
jurisdiction to hear progress reports. The nature and manner of the re-
ports and the procedure for dealing with them were not explicitly de-
fined in the initial order, but were clarified as the hearings proceeded.  
By majority decision, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal held that the 
retention of jurisdiction and reporting requirements exceeded the trial 
judge’s jurisdiction under section 24(1) of the Charter. The dissenting 
judges in the Supreme Court of Canada would have upheld this result, 
on the basis that the trial judge’s order failed to meet standards of pro-
cedural fairness, breached the functus officio doctrine, and exceeded the 
proper role of the judiciary. The majority judges upheld the remedy on 
the basis that it was effective to vindicate the rights of the claimants and 
employed remedial techniques appropriate to the judicial role. 
2. Unanimous Support for Effective and Imaginative Charter 
Remedies 
At the outset, it is important to note that, although the dissenting 
judges rejected the appropriateness of the reporting remedy ordered 
by the trial judge, they did confirm their support for “effectively enforc-
ing constitutional rights”5 and recognized “the need for efficacy and 
                                                                                                                                
5 Doucet-Boudreau, supra, note 1, at para. 91 [S.C.R.]. 
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imagination in the development of constitutional remedies.”6 In addi-
tion, they acknowledged that “superior courts’ powers to craft Charter 
remedies may not be constrained by statutory or common law limits.”7 
They set out alternative means by which, in their view, the Court could 
have appropriately achieved its remedial objective in the Doucet-
Boudreau case.8 Furthermore, they recognized that “in the appropriate 
factual circumstances, injunctive relief may become necessary”9 and 
may be appropriate “where it is the only way that a claimant’s rights can 
be vindicated.”10 The dissenters also affirm that  
[courts] must be assertive in enforcing constitutional rights. At times, 
they have to grant such relief as will be required to safeguard basic 
constitutional rights and the rule of law, despite the sensitivity of 
certain issues or circumstances and the reverberations of their 
decisions in their societal environment.11 
Accordingly, the objections of the dissenters to supervisory reme-
dies are not absolute, but are objections of degree. In the dissenters’ 
view, the supervisory remedy is one of last resort. They asserted that, 
unless it is established that the executive defies a directly applicable 
judicial order, “increased judicial intervention in public administration 
will rarely be appropriate,”12 and, further, that “[c]ourts should not un-
duly encroach on areas which should remain the responsibility of public 
administration and should avoid turning themselves into managers of 
the public service.”13 Accordingly, despite some general statements to 
the contrary,14 it appears that the dissenters did contemplate circum-
stances in which a superior court will properly order supervisory reme-
dies in order to enforce constitutional rights. 
The majority judges asserted the importance of a purposive ap-
proach to the interpretation of remedies provisions, requiring that the 
                                                                                                                                
6 Id., at para. 94. 
7 Id., at para. 105. 
8  Id., at para. 142. 
9  Id., at para. 134. 
10  Id., at para. 135. 
11  Id., at para. 106. 
12  Id., at para. 140. 
13 Id., at para. 91. 
14  See, for example, statements, id., at paras. 117 and 120, referred to infra, in the text 
at notes 28 and 35. 
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remedy be responsive to the right and effective to vindicate the right. 
They affirmed earlier decisions of the Court that the remedies provision 
must be “construed generously,”15 to provide effective, responsive 
remedies that guarantee full, effective and meaningful remedy for Char-
ter violations since “a right, no matter how expansive in theory, is only 
as meaningful as the remedy provided for its breach.”16 The majority 
charged the dissenting judges with “severely undervalu[ing] the impor-
tance and the urgency of the language rights in the context [of this 
case].”17 They focused on the impact of government delay in complying 
with clear obligations under section 23 of the Charter, which itself was 
designed to correct past injustices.18 The majority emphasized the criti-
cal need for timely compliance with minority language education rights 
since delay leads to assimilation and erosion of the numbers that warrant 
the right. In the view of the majority, the case presented circumstances 
of necessity and urgency that justify affirmative remedies.  
3. Different Views on the Appropriate Role of the Judiciary  
In defining limits on a superior court’s remedial powers, the dis-
senters held that a remedy under section 24(1) will not be appropriate 
and just unless it has “the requisite legitimacy and certainty.”19 In their 
view, the reporting remedy in Doucet-Boudreau failed to comply with 
section 24(1) because it failed to meet standards of procedural fairness 
and exceeded the appropriate role of the judiciary. 
(a) Procedural Fairness 
The dissenters considered that the reporting order was seriously 
flawed in that it failed to provide clear notice of the obligations of the 
parties. They chided the trial judge for failing to observe “basic rules of 
                                                                                                                                
15  Supra, note 1, at para. 24 [S.C.R.], citing McLachlin C.J., for the Court, in R. v. 
974649 Ontario Inc., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 75, at para. 18, [2001] S.C.J. No. 79 [hereinafter 
“Dunedin Construction”]. 
16  Doucet-Boudreau, id., at para. 25, quoting McLachlin C.J. in “Dunedin Construc-
tion,” supra, note 15, at paras. 19-20. 
17  Doucet-Boudreau, id., at para. 23. 
18 Id., at paras. 26-28. 
19 Id., at para. 147. 
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legal writing,”20 “canons of good legal drafting,”21 and the fundamental 
importance of procedural fairness.22 They asserted that the remedial 
order failed to specify the form and content of the required reports and 
the procedure, purpose, and nature of reporting hearings. Without identi-
fying any actual prejudice to the responding province resulting from the 
lack of definition, the dissenting judges concluded that the reporting 
order breached the parties’ interest in procedural fairness and was inap-
propriate and void on that basis alone.  
The majority judges acknowledged that “future orders of this type 
could be more explicit and detailed with respect to the ... procedure at 
reporting hearings,”23 but concluded that the order was not “incompre-
hensible, ... impossible to follow ... [or] unclear in a way that would 
render it invalid.”24 They noted that, while there was some uncertainty 
in the procedure to be followed, matters were clarified as they pro-
ceeded, and the process, together with the guidance of appellate courts, 
will be instructive to counsel and judges in future cases. 
(b) The Role of the Judiciary in Remedying Government Inaction 
The dissenting judges considered that the trial judge breached the 
common law principle of functus officio, as well as a constitutional 
principle of separation of powers, by retaining jurisdiction to order the 
province to make progress reports and thereby encroached on the execu-
tive’s responsibility for public administration. The majority judges re-
jected this approach, holding that the court’s constitutionally defined 
remedial role is not restricted by concepts of judicial restraint, or by 
principles derived from statutory or common law. Rather, the court’s 
remedial role is to be determined on the basis of what remedy is appro-
priate and just to vindicate the infringement of a constitutional right.  
                                                                                                                                
20  Id., at para. 91. 
21 Id., at para. 94. 
22 Id., at paras. 97-104. 
23 Id., at para. 84. 
24 Id., at para. 83. 
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(i) Retaining Jurisdiction and the Doctrine of Functus Officio 
The dissenting judges relied on the doctrine of functus officio to 
conclude that the trial judge could not retain jurisdiction to hear reports 
on the province’s progress toward compliance with the terms of his 
order. They asserted the need for finality of decisions in order to facili-
tate appeals. The majority judges rejected the primacy of the functus 
officio argument in that a common law principle cannot limit the broad 
grant of remedial jurisdiction in section 24(1).25 The majority recog-
nized that the policy reflected in the principle may be relevant in deter-
mining whether the trial judge’s remedial order was appropriate. The 
majority concluded, however, that the functus officio doctrine did not 
apply in that instance since the trial judge did not retain power to alter 
his disposition of the case. He had made a final disposition with respect 
to the scope of section 23, the finding of infringement, and the action to 
be taken by the province by way of remedy, and thus provided a stable 
basis for appeal.26 The majority concluded that, having come to a final 
disposition, the trial judge acted appropriately in including, as part of his 
order, the requirement of progress reports: “[t]he change announced by 
s. 24 of the Charter is that the flexibility inherent in an equitable reme-
dial jurisdiction may be applied to orders addressed to government to 
vindicate constitutionally entrenched rights.”27 
(ii) Separation of Powers 
The dissenting members of the Court considered that  
if a court intervenes ... in matters of administration properly entrusted 
to the executive, it exceeds its proper sphere and thereby breaches the 
separation of powers. By crossing the boundary between judicial acts 
and administrative oversight, it acts illegitimately and without 
jurisdiction. Such a crossing of the boundary cannot be characterized 
as relief that is “appropriate and just in the circumstances” within the 
meaning of s. 24(1) of the Charter.28 
                                                                                                                                
25  Id., at para. 75. 
26  Id., at paras. 79-80. 
27  Id., at para. 73.  
28  Id., at para. 117. 
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Thus, the dissenting judges appear to negate any possibility of supe-
rior courts issuing remedies that require supervision of executive action. 
The language is inconsistent with their acknowledgment, noted above,29 
that supervisory remedies may be appropriate in some cases. There also 
appears to be a contradiction in the fact that the dissenting judges con-
sidered it appropriate for courts to intrude on the executive function to 
the extent of ordering the provision of facilities and programs in accor-
dance with a specified timetable, but unacceptable to require the gov-
ernment to report on its progress in doing so, even in the face of a 
history of delay in fulfilling its well-defined constitutional responsibility.  
The dissenters relied on the separation of powers which, they al-
leged, is now “entrenched as a cornerstone of our constitutional re-
gime.”30 However, it is not entirely clear what this separation of powers 
entails. For instance, later in the reasons, the dissenting judges referred 
to the “balance that has been struck between our three branches of gov-
ernment”31 but still later, they referred to the fact that “in [Canada], the 
executive is inextricably tied to the legislative branch.”32  
These statements contradict each other and the assertion of a doc-
trine of separation of powers is inconsistent with Canada’s historical, 
legal, and political organization. As stated in the Preamble to the Consti-
tution Act, 1867,33 Canada’s Constitution is similar in principle to that of 
the United Kingdom, and thus predicated on a fusion of executive and 
legislative powers with an independent judiciary. In asserting a strict 
separation of powers between executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches of government, the dissenters are appropriating a concept 
based on the American constitution and using it to limit the scope of 
judicial remedies, as advocated by some Charter critics who argue that 
courts are usurping government’s ability to govern.34 
To the dissenting judges, judicial supervision of governmental func-
tions breaches the principle of separation of powers in three ways. First, 
the court acts beyond its capacities since the judiciary is “ill equipped to 
                                                                                                                                
29  See the text at notes 6-11. 
30  Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), supra, note 1, at para. 107. 
31  Id., at para. 111. 
32  Id., at para. 123. 
33  (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 50. 
34  See, for example, Morton & Knopff, The Charter Revolution and The Court Party 
(2000), at 153. 
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make polycentric choices or to evaluate the wide-ranging consequences 
that flow from policy implementation.”35 Accordingly, as in Eldridge v. 
British Columbia (Attorney General),36 the court should recognize that it 
is up to government to choose from among the various options to rectify 
the constitutional infringement.37  
Second, the dissenting judges asserted that the supervisory remedies 
infringe the separation of powers by undermining the co-operation and 
mutual respect that characterizes the relationships between branches of 
government in Canada.38 They referred to the well-established require-
ment that legislatures and governments respect the independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary39 and turned the proposition around to argue 
that courts should avoid, as a general rule, interfering in the manage-
ment of public administration except as necessary to supervise adminis-
trative tribunals, and guard constitutional rights and the rule of law.40 In 
fact, however, the independence of courts from the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches is based on their need to be independent and impartial 
in order to meet the requirements of the rule of law. By contrast, the 
legislative and executive branches are subject to judicial review. Judicial 
intrusion in the work of the legislative and executive branches is implic-
itly required in our constitutional arrangements and explicitly authorized 
by section 24(1) of the Charter. Thus, a constitutional doctrine of the 
separation of powers does not provide a basis for distinguishing between 
acceptable and unacceptable judicial intervention. When the court de-
cides an issue of constitutional entitlement and enforcement, as between 
a claimant and the state, the court must be even-handed in determining 
the appropriate and just remedy. It should not defer to government on 
the basis of an obligation of mutual co-operation and respect that pre-
vails over the claimants’ constitutional entitlement. 
Third, the dissenting judges asserted that, by requiring government 
to report, the trial judge exerted political pressure on government and 
thereby infringed the separation of powers. The dissenters concluded that, 
since courts are entitled to protection from political pressure exercised by 
                                                                                                                                
35  Doucet-Boudreau, supra, note 1, at para. 120. See also para. 124. 
36  [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624, at para. 96, [1997] S.C.J. No. 86. 
37  Doucet-Boudreau, supra, note 1, at para. 124. 
38  Id., at para. 121. 
39  Id., at para 109. 
40 Id., at para. 110. 
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government, government should also be protected from political pres-
sure exerted by courts.41 By characterizing measures to ensure timely 
compliance with Charter rights as the application of political pressure, 
the dissenting judges called into question the fundamental capacity of 
courts to enforce Charter guarantees in any circumstances. 
As the majority judges recognized, there are limits on the degree to 
which it is appropriate for courts to micro-manage the means by which 
governments comply with Charter remedies. These appropriate limits 
are not determined by a doctrine of separation of powers, but rather are 
based on the respective institutional capacities of courts and govern-
ments: “in the context of constitutional remedies, courts must be sensi-
tive to their role as judicial arbiter and not fashion remedies which usurp 
the role of the other branches of governance by taking on tasks to which 
other persons or bodies are better suited.”42 On the facts of Doucet-
Boudreau, however, the majority judges considered that the remedial 
orders made by the trial judge, including the progress reports, were 
well-within judicial competence: 
The order in this case was in no way inconsistent with the judicial 
function. There was never any suggestion in this case that the court 
would, for example, improperly take over the detailed management 
and co-ordination of the construction projects. Hearing evidence and 
supervising cross-examinations on progress reports about the construc-
tion of schools are not beyond the normal capacities of courts.43  
4. Assessing Whether a Remedy is “Appropriate and Just in the 
Circumstances” 
The majority judges were not prepared to read limits into the broad 
wording of section 24(1) on the basis of concepts like judicial restraint 
and separation of powers, procedural principles like functus officio, or 
remedial law developed in other, non-Charter, contexts.44 Instead, they 
                                                                                                                                
41  Id., at paras. 130-32. 
42  Id., at para. 34. 
43  Id., at para. 74. 
44  Id., at paras. 53-54. 
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set forth “broad considerations that judges should bear in mind when 
evaluating the appropriateness and justice of a potential remedy”:45 
The remedy must meaningfully vindicate “the rights and freedoms of 
the claimants ... [taking into account] the nature of the right that has 
been violated and the situation of the claimant.”46 
The remedy must “employ means that are legitimate within the 
framework of our constitutional democracy... [thus courts] must not … 
depart unduly or unnecessarily from their role of adjudicating disputes 
and granting remedies that address the matter of those disputes.”47 
The remedy must be “judicial ... invoking the function and powers of a 
court ... inferred, in part, from the tasks with which [courts] are 
normally charged and for which they have developed procedures and 
precedent.”48 
The remedy should be “fair to the party against whom the order is 
made... and not impose substantial hardships that are unrelated to 
securing the right.”49 
The majority judges emphasized that “the judicial approach to reme-
dies must remain flexible and responsive” and that section 24(1) should 
be allowed to evolve, free of the restrictions of traditional and historical 
remedial practice.50  
5. The Majority Judges’ Application of the Remedial Factors in 
this Case 
The majority judges applied the four factors for assessing whether a 
remedy is appropriate and just in the circumstances, and affirmed the 
trial judge’s order requiring the province to report on progress in com-
plying with the terms of the remedy.  
                                                                                                                                
45  Id., at para. 54. 
46  Id., at para. 55. 
47  Id., at para. 56. 
48  Id., at para. 57. 
49  Id., at para. 58. 
50  Id., at para. 59. 
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First, the majority concluded that the reporting order vindicated un-
disputed minority language education rights by providing an expedited 
procedure for identifying problems with timely implementation of the 
rights in the context of a history of delay and serious rates of assimila-
tion of those who speak French.  
Second, the majority held that the reporting order was consistent 
with the role of the courts in Canada’s constitutional order, and appro-
priately utilized the court’s jurisdiction not only to declare constitutional 
rights but to enforce them with injunctions against the executive.51  
Third, the majority determined that the reporting order was appro-
priately judicial in nature, utilizing “functions and powers known to 
courts.”52 The majority judges provided examples, from non-Charter 
litigation, of courts exercising “active and even managerial roles in the 
exercise of their traditional equitable powers”:53 in bankruptcy and re-
ceivership matters, in trusts and estates, and in family law. Thus, for 
example, in bankruptcy and receivership matters, the presiding judge 
supervised the company’s operations during its restructuring process. 
While some have questioned the overall workability of the current credi-
tor-protection legislative scheme, others note that a presiding bank-
ruptcy judge has a wide-range of remedial powers.54 To illustrate, during 
Air Canada’s current restructuring, James Farley J. has: 1) ordered par-
ties to negotiate,55 2) determined who can bid for Air Canada’s Aero-
plan,56 3) appointed a facilitator to assist during the ordered negotiations 
between various unions and Air Canada management57 and 4) decided 
which bid would be accepted to purchase a stake in Air Canada.58 The 
remedial actions demonstrate the extent to which a judge may be re-
quired to undertake a supervisory, and even a managerial, role in legal 
processes unrelated to constitutional litigation. In these instances the 
                                                                                                                                
51  Id., at para. 70. 
52  Id., at para. 71. 
53  Id., at para. 71, quoting Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada (looseleaf), at 
para. 13.60. 
54  Susan Pigg, “Law’s flaws threaten airline” Toronto Star (April 22, 2003) D1. 
55  Susan Pigg & Rick Westhead, “Airline in holding pattern” Toronto Star (April 23, 
2003) E1. 
56
  Susan Pigg, “Judge opens bidding for Aeroplan deal” Toronto Star (May 2, 2003) E1. 
57
  Susan Pigg, “5 unions, Air Canada ordered into talks” Toronto Star (May 10, 2003) 
C1. 
58
  Rick Westhead, “Bid expected for Air Canada” Toronto Star (December 9, 2003) D1. 
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judicial supervisory powers are being exercised within the private, 
rather than the public, sector, but they do establish precedents to rebut 
the argument that the supervisory role is beyond the experience and 
competence of courts.  
In Doucet-Boudreau, the majority judges concluded that requiring 
government to report on its progress in complying with the court’s order 
was consistent with the judicial function, and with the normal capacities 
of courts to hear evidence and supervise cross-examinations. They spe-
cifically noted that the court did not “improperly take over the detailed 
management and co-ordination of the construction projects.”59  
As the American experience demonstrates, there could presumably 
be circumstances, far beyond the facts of this case, in which a court, 
facing a recalcitrant government institution, might be required to engage 
in detailed supervision of institutional processes in order to enforce 
compliance with Charter norms. It still seems unlikely that Canadian 
governments will refuse or fail to comply with court orders declaring 
constitutional rights. The continuation of the tradition of respect and 
compliance will depend on the public’s perception of the legitimacy of 
judicial review, its support for judicial elaborations of constitutional 
guarantees,60 and the extent to which the costs of constitutional compli-
ance compete for and claim priority in the allocation of scarce public 
resources. Even though Canadian courts could become involved in de-
tailed supervision of non-complying government programs, there was 
no risk of such involvement in the Doucet-Boudreau case. 
Fourth, the majority determined that the reporting order was suffi-
ciently fair to the respondent government, in that it was not overly 
vague, incomprehensible, or impossible to follow. The majority ac-
knowledged that the order could have been more explicit and detailed, 
and that there were alternatives to a reporting order that a trial judge 
might consider, but they concluded that the reporting order was within 
the range of appropriate remedies open to the trial judge in his exercise 
of discretion. 
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Accordingly, the majority judges concluded that the reporting order 
was an appropriate and just remedy in all the circumstances. 
6. Standard of Appellate Review of Remedial Orders Under 
Section 24(1) 
The majority judges emphasized that a superior court judge has a 
wide and unfettered discretion under section 24(1) to design the remedy 
that is appropriate and just in the circumstances, and that the exercise of 
that discretion should be treated with deference by appellate courts. 
They affirm that “[t]he trial judge is not required to identify the single 
best remedy, even if that were possible.”61 They did suggest an alterna-
tive approach to remedies in situations of this kind: “[i]t may be more 
helpful in some cases for the trial judge to seek submissions on whether 
to specify a timetable with a right of the government to seek variation 
where just and appropriate to do so,”62 but they confirmed that the trial 
judge’s remedy was “clearly appropriate and just in the circum-
stances.”63 
The dissenters agreed that deference was the appropriate standard of 
appellate review as to remedy, but asserted that deference does not ap-
ply where “fundamental legal principles are threatened.”64 In their view, 
respect for the executive branch of government requires that supervisory 
orders be made only where government has failed or refused to comply 
with prior judicial orders rendered in the same matter. In the dissenters’ 
view, the failure of the province to give effect to well-defined minority 
language education rights, in circumstances where time was of the es-
sence and delay would undermine entitlement to the rights, was insuffi-
cient to warrant the supervisory role of the Court. The dissenters would 
thus encourage those whose rights are delayed to resort to litigation 
early, building a record of their constitutional claims and of government 
non-compliance, not only in public forums but also in the courts. Strate-
gic decisions to pursue public lobbying rather than resort to litigation 
early in the process could delay entitlement to an effective judicial 
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remedy. The majority properly rejected this approach in favour of a 
broader assessment of the manner in which government has sought to 
fulfill, or avoid, its clearly defined constitutional obligations. Resort to 
litigation, with its attendant costs to private individuals and organiza-
tions, may properly be a last resort after other avenues of persuasion 
have been pursued, but recalcitrance in the face of a prior court order is 
not a condition precedent to a supervisory remedy. Accordingly, the 
majority declined to fetter the broad remedial discretion of the trial 
judge or to substitute what it might consider to be a more appropriate 
process for administering a constitutional remedy. 
Since the dissenting judges considered that the trial judge’s report-
ing order failed to respect fundamental principles, they would have been 
prepared to displace his discretion with their preferred disposition. In 
their view, the trial judge should have issued a final order, with no re-
porting requirement, on the assumption that government would comply. 
In the event of non-compliance, it would then be open to the claimants 
to seek an order of contempt. 
The majority judges rejected this alternative as being less appropri-
ate, in the circumstances, than the reporting order in that it requires 
initiating a new proceeding, on the basis of new material, before a new 
judge, with significant attendant delay and cost. Even if the proposed 
remedy were an appropriate and just alternative, it should not, in the ma-
jority’s view, displace the proper exercise of the trial judge’s discretion. 
III.  LEARNING FROM AMERICAN EXPERIENCE  
WITH SUPERVISORY REMEDIES 
Neither the majority judges nor the dissenting judges referred to the 
experience of American courts with supervisory remedies for constitu-
tional violations. The most far-reaching and intrusive of these remedies 
in terms of impact on governmental or institutional action is the struc-
tural injunction, in which a court requires an institution to implement an 
action plan to ensure future compliance with constitutional norms.65 The 
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remedy is extraordinary and intrusive, and is ordered only where an 
institution remains in violation of a previous ruling on constitutional 
rights. The court may require the institution to file periodic progress 
reports, and may appoint a special master under Rule 53 of the U.S. 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure66 with responsibility to formulate an 
appropriate action plan, and, if necessary, to oversee its implementation. 
In the face of institutional intransigence, the presiding federal judge may 
take direct jurisdiction over the management of the institution. The 
supervisory jurisdiction continues until the institution demonstrates that 
it has reached full compliance with the remedial order or that, on the 
basis of its continual good faith compliance, it will reach full compliance.  
Federal judges in the United States have decreed and supervised 
structural injunctions to remedy segregation in schools and the failure to 
comply with minimum constitutional standards in prisons and mental 
hospitals. In these instances, resistance to constitutional rights leaves the 
court with only two options: abandon the constitutional right or enforce 
it by modifying institutional norms and practices. The dissenting judges 
in Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia are right to emphasize the impor-
tance in Canada of the well-established tradition that governments re-
spect and comply with decisions of the court on matters of constitutional 
law. On the other hand, as both majority and dissenting judges recog-
nized, extraordinary circumstances may warrant extraordinary remedies. 
One extraordinary circumstance that may warrant the remedy of ju-
dicial supervision is the resolution of Native land claims. Land claims 
can involve protracted periods of litigation and inordinate expenses for 
all parties. However, a judicially supervised process where a judge re-
tains jurisdiction to resolve impasses between the parties over the spe-
cific applications of generally defined rights might assist in expediting 
the process. In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,67 both parties sought a 
remedy whereby the Court of Appeal would retain jurisdiction for two 
years in order to enable the parties to negotiate.68 The Court of Appeal 
refused to grant the remedy, holding that “the role of the Court of Appeal 
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is not one of tailoring its judgment so as to facilitate settlement.”69 In the 
Supreme Court of Canada, Lamer C.J. agreed that a court of appeal 
must make legal declarations based on the trial record.70 The Court 
ordered a new trial, but encouraged the parties to negotiate rather than 
proceed with litigation. Chief Justice Lamer concluded that: 
Ultimately, it is through negotiated settlements, with good faith and 
give and take on all sides, reinforced by the judgments of this Court, 
that we will achieve what I stated in Van der Peet, supra … to be a 
basic purpose of s. 35(1) – “the reconciliation of the pre-existence of 
aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown”. Let us face it, 
we are all here to stay.71 
A role for superior court judges in supervising Native land claims 
negotiations could help to expedite the process, provided that it can be 
managed in such a way as to protect any rights of appeal from judicial 
determinations. The potential advantages of judicial supervision of abo-
riginal claims are reinforced by the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision 
in R. v. Powley.72 The Court approved the Ontario Court of Appeal’s 
staying of its decision to allow for what the Court characterized as “fos-
ter[ing] cooperative solutions.”73 The Supreme Court approved a broad 
framework of rights within which the parties could negotiate, without 
providing for judicial supervision. The problem with this solution is 
that, if one of the parties will not negotiate or negotiates in bad faith, the 
other must commence a new court proceeding, leading to greater delay, 
duplication, and expense. In Native claims, retaining jurisdiction and 
providing for judicial supervision of negotiation between the parties 
might constitute the more appropriate and just remedy. 
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IV.  THE RESPONSIBILITY OF PARLIAMENT AND THE LEGISLATURES 
FOR REVISING JURISDICTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL SYSTEMS TO 
IMPLEMENT SECTION 24(1) 
The majority judges in Doucet-Boudreau properly concluded that 
section 24(1) provides broad discretion to develop Charter remedies that 
are responsive and effective in vindicating Charter rights. The broad and 
flexible remedial jurisdiction, may require “novel and creative features” 
unrestricted by “traditional and historical remedial practice” which 
“cannot be barriers to what reasoned and compelling notions of appro-
priate and just remedies demand.”74 The confirmation that the remedies 
available under section 24(1) will be determined on the basis of a pur-
posive and broad interpretation is encouraging, but its promise is un-
dermined by the fact that it is restricted to superior court judges. The 
combined effect of legislative inaction and court acquiescence has lim-
ited the remedial role of statutory and inferior courts and tribunals and 
thus undermines access to effective Charter remedies.  
The majority judges concluded that “superior courts retain ‘con-
stant, complete, and concurrent jurisdiction’ to issue remedies under 
s. 24(1)”75 and that there are no fetters on their jurisdiction.76 Nonethe-
less, they accepted the explanation advanced in R. v. Mills77 that “s. 
24(1) did not confer new jurisdiction on statutory and inferior tribunals 
beyond that which was intended by the legislator as reflected in the 
tribunal’s function and the practical limits imposed by its structure.”78 In 
other words, access to remedies may be dependent on “traditional and 
historical” systems of jurisdiction and procedure that were designed for 
the adjudication of non-Charter issues and have not been reconsidered in 
light of section 24(1) of the Charter. 
Parliament and the legislatures have not reviewed their laws in rela-
tion to the jurisdiction and procedure of courts and tribunals to give 
effect to the constitutional purpose set forth in section 24(1). By default, 
only the superior courts of inherent jurisdiction have the capacity to 
accept the full mandate of section 24(1). Even though the judges in 
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majority79 and the judges in dissent80 agree that Charter rights and reme-
dies cannot be limited by statute or by the common law, they continue to 
approve the position advanced by McIntyre J. in Mills that “the Charter 
was not intended to turn the Canadian legal system upside down. What 
is required rather is that it be fitted into the existing scheme of Canadian 
legal procedure.”81  
Even if the intentions of the drafters of the Charter could be ascer-
tained, it is well-established that the interpretation of a provision of the 
Charter is not governed by original intentions but must give effect to the 
purpose of the provision, generously construed.82 Where existing laws 
do not comply with the constitution, purposively construed, they will be 
of no force and effect.83 Why is it, then, that the remedies available for 
Charter infringement vary depending upon the pre-existing jurisdiction 
and procedure of the particular court or tribunal in the particular pro-
ceeding in which the issue arises? 
Do existing jurisdictional and procedural systems, designed for non-
constitutional matters, provide an effective framework for remedying 
constitutional wrongs? If not, what are courts and legislatures to do? 
In its unanimous decision in Dunedin Construction,84 the Supreme 
Court of Canada confirmed its intent to interpret section 24(1) of the 
Charter to  
achieve a broad, purposive interpretation that facilitates direct access 
to appropriate and just Charter remedies..., while respecting the 
structure and practice of the existing court system and the exclusive 
role of Parliament and the legislatures in prescribing the jurisdiction of 
courts and tribunals.85 
The Court affirmed that “it remains the role of Parliament and the 
legislatures, and not the judiciary, to assign jurisdiction to the various 
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courts and tribunals comprising our legal system.”86 Nonetheless, since 
most courts and tribunals were established prior to enactment of the 
Charter, their enabling legislation does not address their jurisdiction to 
award remedies for Charter infringements. Accordingly, courts must 
determine whether the jurisdiction can be inferred. In Dunedin Con-
struction, the Court adopted a “functional and structural” approach: 
“[w]here the Charter’s enactment implicated a court or tribunal in new 
constitutional issues, it should be presumed that the legislature intended 
the court or tribunal to resolve these issues where it is suited to do so by 
virtue of its function and structure.”87 Accordingly, a court or tribunal 
may now have jurisdiction to award remedies under section 24(1) even 
in the absence of express jurisdiction to award the type of remedy that is 
sought. The Court will examine the enabling legislation, the history, and 
accepted practice of the court or tribunal, and determine whether it has 
“the tools necessary to fashion the remedy sought … in a just, fair and 
consistent manner without impeding its ability to perform its intended 
function.”88 The Court has thus signalled its willingness to determine the 
jurisdiction of courts and tribunals to award Charter remedies on a case-
by-case basis, subject to explicit legislative intention. 
In at least one other instance where a procedural system was found 
to be inadequate, the Court declined to redesign it through the vehicle of 
case-by-case analysis, and called on legislatures to step up to the plate. 
Thus, in General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. Naken89 the Supreme Court 
of Canada declined to approve a class action, and identified “the need 
for a comprehensive legislative scheme for the institution and conduct 
of class actions.”90 Some legislatures eventually responded, leading to 
the enactment of class action legislation,91 which has enabled the use of 
class actions. It thus remains puzzling that the Supreme Court of Canada 
accepts as inevitable that existing jurisdictional and procedural frame-
works must be utilized in Charter litigation whether or not they are 
                                                                                                                                
86  Id., at para. 26. 
87  Id., at para. 42. 
88  Id., at para. 45. 
89  [1983] 1 S.C.R. 72, per Estey J. 
90  Id., at 93. 
91  For example, in Ontario, the Law Reform Commission studied the issues and made 
recommendations (Report on Class Actions (3 vols., 1982)), and 10 years later the Ontario 
Legislature enacted the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6.  
98  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 25 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
appropriate to the determination of constitutional claims, and refrains 
from calling on Parliament and the legislatures to address the issues in a 
manner that will facilitate effective remedies for constitutional in-
fringements. The Court’s willingness to infer remedial jurisdiction on 
the basis of the tribunal’s function and structure opens up remedial po-
tential, but generates uncertainty, requires expensive litigation on juris-
dictional issues, and will be ineffective in the face of express statutory 
provisions or in the absence of appropriate “tools” or procedures. The 
Court’s conservative approach to remedies, as I have argued else-
where,92 is unsatisfactory in that: 
 
1) It may limit inferior courts and tribunals to awarding the most ap-
propriate and just of the remedies that happen to be available in the 
particular court or tribunal through the procedure utilized to initiate 
the proceeding, and thus may defeat the purpose of section 24(1). 
2) To obtain an effective remedy, it may be necessary to launch a mul-
tiplicity of proceedings with the attendant duplication and expense 
and the possibility of inconsistent results. 
3) Courts and tribunals may try to fit constitutional wrongs within 
traditional remedies rather than fashioning remedies appropriate to 
redress constitutional wrongs.  
4) In effect, Charter remedies are subjected to legislative control. 
Moreover, the control is divided in accordance with the division of 
powers, with no encouragement to co-operative action between the 
two levels of government93 to make available an appropriate array 
of remedial procedures and powers, drawing on criminal and civil 
jurisdiction. 
 
In the absence of judicial encouragement, it is unlikely that Parlia-
ment and the legislatures will undertake a review of jurisdictional and 
procedural requirements for the purpose of developing wider accessibility 
to more effective Charter remedies against governments. The expansive 
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and flexible approach demonstrated by the majority judges in Doucet-
Boudreau in addressing the remedial powers of superior court judges 
should also be reflected in the design of jurisdictional and procedural 
systems that equip other courts and tribunals to provide appropriate and 
just remedies for Charter infringements. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia, the majority judges addressed 
the need to ensure that there is at least one forum, the superior court, in 
which a claimant has access to a full range of Charter remedies, estab-
lished and novel, from which the judge can tailor the remedy that is 
most appropriate and just in the circumstances. The challenge, now, is 
twofold: first, to hold the ground against those who urge judicial re-
straint in remedying unjustified infringements of guaranteed constitu-
tional rights, and, second, to expand the application of section 24(1) 
beyond the superior courts to those courts and tribunals with jurisdiction 
to determine constitutional issues. 
 
 
  
